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MAINTAINING AN ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM OF
JUSTICE: THE STATES' REFUSAL TO FOLLOW THE
SUPREME COURT'S SANCTIONING OF OFFICIAL
POLICE DECEPTION IN MORAN V. BURBINE
John F. Terzano*
Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system. Such has
been the characteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice since it freed
itself from practices borrowed by the Star Chamber from the Continent
whereby an accused was interrogated in secret for hours on end. Under our
system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused
not out of his own mouth. It must establish its case, not by interrogation of
the accused even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently
secured through skillful investigation.... Protracted, systematic and uncontrolled subjection of an accused to interrogation by the police for the purpose of eliciting disclosures or confessions is subversive of the accusatorial
system.'
INTRODUCTION

Justice Frankfurter wrote this eloquent description of our justice system almost
fifty years ago. Since then, our justice system has come to recognize an individual's fundamental right to be represented by counsel when confronting the state's
full weight in a criminal proceeding.2 Federal and state courts recognize the right
to counsel unless the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived that
right.' Indeed, the manner in which our society respects the liberties and rights
* J.D., University of the District of Columbia School of Law, expected 1999. I am deeply indebted to University of District of Columbia School of Law professors Judge William C. Pryor, Laurie
Morin, and Joseph Tuiman as well as Georgetown University of Law professor John Copacino, for

their invaluable comments on earlier drafts. I am also most grateful to my many colleagues, friends,
and family for their patience, encouragement, and support. This article is dedicated to Marianne.
Michael, Angelina, Virginia, Bobby, and Solange.

1 Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949) (reversing defendant's murder conviction
and ruling his confession inadmissible where the police held defendant for six days, questioning him
repeatedly by teams of officers over a period of eight to 10 hours daily).

2 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (emphasizing that an accused -need not stand
alone against the State at any stage in the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out . . . ."). See
also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (reaffirming that a -person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-

ment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him)."
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing a prophylactic rule against self incrimination during custodial interrogation).
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of the accused distinguishes our system of justice from most others.4 The
Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona epitomized the Court's respect
for the rights of an accused, especially one's right to counsel in such environments
as the intrinsicly coercive setting of custodial interrogation. 5 For almost two decades following Miranda, numerous states adhered to Miranda's goals. Courts
suppressed defendants' statements where police deception resulting in "incommunicado interrogation" violated an accused's Miranda rights. 6 Moreover, prior

to Miranda, New York developed a prophylactic rule that required a suspect's
attorney to be present during custodial interrogation.' This requirement effectively banned "incommunicado interrogation" in that state.8 Likewise, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts developed its own per se rule.9 Furthermore,
Louisiana recognized the adversarial and coercive nature of custodial interrogations and legislated additional protections for individuals
faced with such pro10
ceedings through the state's constitution and statutes.
4 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 436 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
6 See Moran 475 U.S. at 439 n. 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing The American Bar Association's amici curiae brief listing a number of states where the courts excluded the defendant's statements resulting from improper police conduct). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McKenna, 244 N.E.2d 560
(Mass. 1969) (misinforming lawyer retained by suspect's mother, of suspect's whereabouts and that
the police were already interrogating the suspect). Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 370 A.2d 322 (Pa.
1977) (denying to attorney that suspect was in custody and later refusing the attorney access to the
suspect during interrogation). Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528 (Okla. 1984) (directing attorney, hired by
suspect's parents, to go to other areas of the courthouse and jail while the suspect, unaware that an
attorney had been retained on his behalf, was being interrogated in another part of the building).
7 See People v. Arthur, 239 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1968) (holding that if a suspect is in custodial
interrogation and an attorney has entered the proceeding, the suspect can only waive his Miranda
rights in the presence of the attorney. If the suspect has already waived his rights and an attorney then
enters the proceedings, the suspect must re-waive his Miranda rights in the presence of the attorney
before the questioning can continue. Once an attorney enters the proceedings, the police must cease
all questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of the desires of the suspect. The attorney
need not be retained specifically for the suspect, request access to the suspect, or instruct the police to
stop questioning). See also Lorraine J. Adler, New York's Loyalty to the Spirit of Miranda:Simply the
Best for 7wenty-Five Years, 47 VAND. L. REv. 889 (1994) (asserting that the absolute perse prophylactic rule established in Arthur exemplifies the type of protection for an accused envisioned by the
Mirandacourt).
8 See Adler supra note 7, at 916.
9 See Commonwealth v. McKenna, 244 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. 1969) (holding that where the attorney retained by the suspect's family advised the police that he wanted to be present when the suspect
was questioned, the police had a duty to inform the suspect even though the suspect had already
signed a waiver of the right to counsel and the police failure to inform the suspect vitiated said
waiver). See also Daniel J. Lynch, Moran v. Burbine: ConstitutionalRights of Custodial Suspects, 34
WAYNE L. REv. 331 (1987) (suggesting that the Massachusetts per se rule is similar to New York's
because once an attorney has entered the proceedings the police have a duty to secure a rewaiver of a
suspect's right to counsel). Id. at 336. In Massachusetts, police are not required to obtain a rewaiver In
the presence of an attorney, but in New York they are. Id. at 337.
10 Tamera A. Rudd, Louisiana'sRight To Counsel In Light Of Moran v. Burbine, 48 LA. L,
REv. 201 (September 1987). Prior to Moran, Article I, §13 of the Louisiana Constitution and Louisl-
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Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine, effectively eroded
the basic foundation of one's right against self-incrimination by sanctioning the
practice of incommunicado interrogation and endorsing deliberate police deception of an officer of the court." In Moran, the suspect validly waived his Miranda rights even though the police failed to inform him of the efforts of an
attorney who had been retained on his behalf to reach him. 12 Moreover, the
police 13lied to the attorney by stating that they would not further question the
client.

The Moran decision controls with respect to any federal constitutional basis
for suppressing a suspect's statements and in determining the validity of a suspect's waiver of his rights. Regardless, a state is free to adopt "different require14
ments of the conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law."
Since the Moran decision, several states have recognized the need to provide
additional procedural safeguards to protect the rights of an accused.' 5 These
states refuse to transform our cherished accusatorial system of justice into an
inquisitorial system and return to the practice where attorneys -shout their legal
advice to their clients, held in custody, through the jailhouse door."' It is time
for those states still following Moran to heed the example of their sister states in
providing adequate protection for their citizens under their state constitutions,
statutes, or procedural rules. States need not fear when an accused consults with
an attorney, is aware of and understands certain rights, and when he exercises
those rights.
Part I of this note examines the legal development of the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination leading up to the Supreme Court decision in Moran as well as the Moran decision itself. Part II discusses the scholarly controversy surrounding the Moran decision. Part III is a survey of states rejecting
Moran. Finally, Part IV will examine how ethical rules governing attorneys have
created legal rights for an accused.

ana Revised Statutes §15:451 and §15:452 were interpreted to prevent incommunicado interrogation.

However, in State v. Dixon, 527 So.2d 401 (La. 1988) the court, citing Moran, held that although the
defendant knew that his attorney had come to the police station, the defendant never requested the
attorney be present during interrogation, and when informed of his right to have an attorney present,
the defendant waived that right. Id at 403.
11 Moran, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). Police informed attorney retained to represent Burbine that

Burbine would not be questioned further, knowing full well that police officers from another jurisdic.
tion were at the station to question Burbine on the murder charge. Id. at 417.
12 Id. at 420.
13 Id. at 417.
14 Id. at 428.

15 See text accompanying n.69-119.
16 People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923, 929 (Ill. 1995).
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I. Ti

SPMrr OF MRANDA

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in part that no
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' 17 The courts have never interpreted this amendment so literally as to bar
an individual's incriminating testimony at trial only.' 8 Instead, the courts have
applied the Fifth Amendment safeguards during preliminary and grand jury hearcompelled statements could be
ings or other proceedings where an individual's
19
case.
criminal
a
in
individual
the
against
used
The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda firmly incorporated the Fifth
Amendment as the foundation for analyzing the admissibility of a confession.2"
The Court in Miranda established several procedural safeguards that the police
must invoke before questioning a suspect. 2 These rights are vitiated only where
22
the individual knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives those rights. Miranda recognized that the nature of custodial interrogation makes it difficult to
determine what may transpire in a closed room between the police and the accused. 23 This inherently coercive characteristic of custodial interrogation beckoned that procedural safeguards be established. 24 The presence of an attorney
would "insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere
The Court emphasized a strong intolerare not the product of compulsion."
ance toward police threats and trickery used to obtain a waiver of an individual's
rights. 26 Indeed, the Court acknowledged that these safeguards are not "simply a
preliminary ritual" to interrogation, but 27are fundamental to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
17 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
18 See Althea Kuller, Moran v. Burbine: Supreme Court Tolerates Police Interference with the
Attorney-Client Relationship, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 251, n. 58 (1986) (detailing the Supreme Court's
recognition of an accused's right to counsel at pre trial stages and analyzing how the Burbine court
refused to adopt a constitutional rule requiring police to allow attorneys access to clients in custody).
19 Id.
20 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (holding that the rule in Miranda is that "[T]he prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination"). Id. "[Tjhere can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their
freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves."
Id at 467.
21 Id. at 444-45 (establishing that prior to any questioning an individual has the right to remain
silent and the right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed).
22 Id. 384 U.S. at 444.
23 d at 445.
24 Id at 444.
25 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.
26 Id. at 476.
27 Id.
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Subsequently, the Supreme Court's decision in Moran v. Burbine28 undermined Miranda's firmly established procedural safeguards. In Moran, Justice
O'Connor, writing for the six person majority, held defendant's pre-arraignment
confession admissible because the defendant had given the police a valid waiver
of his Mirandarights. 29 Although Justice O'Connor viewed the deliberate police
deception of a suspect's attorney as "highly inappropriate," the police actions did
not meet the "shock the sensibilities" test enough to violate the suspect's consti30
tutional rights.
MOA

v v. ByRB'E FAcTs

Cranston, Rhode Island police arrested Brian Burbine and two other men on a
burglary charge. 3 ' The two other men implicated Burbine in a murder that occurred several months before in Providence, Rhode Island. Meanwhile,
Burbine's sister had retained an attorney from the Public Defender's office. The
attorney called the police station and stated that she represented Burbine. 32 The
33
detective informed the attorney that they were not going to question Burbine.
However, the detective did not inform the attorney that Burbine was also a suspect in a murder investigation and that detectives from Providence were currently at the station ready to question Burbine about that charge. 34 The police
interrogated Burbine several different times that evening.35 Eventually, Burbine
confessed to the murder, and was later found guilty of first degree murder.3 6 A
divided Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 37 The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the police conduct vitiated
38
Burbine's waiver of his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel.
AfoRAAr vr ButwrNwE DECISION

The majority in Moran recognized one of the Miranda Court's principal holdings; custodial interrogations are coercive in nature.39 The Court acknowledged
that the obligations of the police to inform a suspect of his Miranda rights are
28 Moran, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
29 Id. at 420. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Justice Stevens wrote the minority
opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
30 Id. at 433-34.
31 Id. at 416.
32 Id. at 417.
33 Moran, 475 U.S. at 417.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 418.
37 Id.
38 Moran, 475 U.S. at 419.

39 Id. at 420.
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essential in combating the coercive nature of custodial interrogations. 40 Regardless, Moran held that a waiver of one's rights is valid provided the waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, despite the fact that an attorney had
been specifically retained to represent this defendant by a third party.4 ' The
Court applied the totality of circumstances test and determined that Burbine validly waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.4 2 The Court reasoned that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the police utilized any
coercion to evoke statements from Burbine and that Burbine fully understood his
Miranda rights and the potential consequences for waiving them.43
The Court flatly rejected Burbine's assertion that by deliberately failing to inform him of his attorney's attempts to reach him, the police vitiated an otherwise
valid waiver. 44 Although the Court acknowledged that deliberately deceiving an
attorney was "highly inappropriate" police conduct, the Court also asserted that
it was irrelevant to an individual's decision to waive his rights "unless he were at
least aware of the incident.",45 Regardless, the Court concluded that by lying to
Burbine's attorney, the police did not "shock the sensibilities of a civilized soci46
ety" so as to violate Burbine's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.
The Court opined that by requiring the police to inform a suspect in custodial
interrogation of his attorney's efforts to contact him would create a per se rule
that impermissibly expanded the underlying principles of Miranda.4 7 The Court
reasoned that such a rule would upset the balance between the legitimate interests of law enforcement and a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights.48 Furthermore,
the Court refused to require the police to inform a suspect that an attorney was
trying to contact him because it would erode the simplicity and clarity of Miranda
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 420.
Id. at 421 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444).
Id. at 421.
Moran, 475 U.S. at 422.
Id. The court stated that events taking place outside the interrogation room and unknown to

a suspect can have "no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right." Id. The court ruled that an accused might act differently if one knew that an attorney
was available to assist, but the Constitution did not require the police to supply a "suspect with a flow
if information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his
rights." Id.
45 Id. at 423. Although the Court conceded that such behavior is "objectionable as a matter of
ethics" it is not relevant if an accused fully understands the nature of his rights and the results of
waiving them. Id. Such police behavior would have no relevance to any manner of coercion experienced by a suspect. Id.
46 Id. 432-44. The Court acknowledged that there could be instances where police deception
could be so egregious that it would rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation, but that
the facts in the present case "falls short" of such a violation. Id.
47 Id. at 424.
48 Moran, 475 U.S. at 424 (stating the well established principle that "Miranda warnings are not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution" but are simply measures to ensure one's right against
self-incrimination).
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warnings, thereby confusing the police and prosecutors when conducting custodial interrogations.4 9

II. THE MORAN

CONTROVERSY: BREAKING WITH MIRANDA

The underlying premise of the Court's holding in Miranda is the inadequacy of

the voluntariness standard and the need for procedural safeguards.50 The Afiranda Court reasoned that procedural safeguards were necessary to diminish the
inherent, coercive nature of custodial interrogations."1 The Miranda Court was
clear that:
[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened tricked, or cajoled into a
waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his
privilege. The requirement of warnings and waivers is a fundamental with
respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.52
49 Id. at 425-26.
50 See Miranda,384 U.S. at 444 (holding that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from the custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination"). See also Daniel W. Sasaki, Guarding The Guardians: Police Trickery And Confessions, 40
STAN. L. Rav. 1593 (1988) (proposing that the conduct comprising of police trickery to secure a
confession can be defined as a "deliberate distortion of a material fact, [a] failure to disclose to the
defendant a material fact, or by playing on a defendant's emotions or scruples").
51 384 U.S. at 445. See also Adler supra note 7 (suggesting that since the Miranda court recognized the coercive nature of custodial interrogation, the Court's decision was just a "starting point" of
diminishing the coercive nature of custodial interrogations and giving "full effect to the privilege
against self-incrimination").
52 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. The Court's concern regarding police interrogation tactics was
heightened after examining several police manuals. Id. at 448-56. The Court noted that several manuals state that the:
principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being
alone with the person under interrogation.... The subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is
more clearly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions of criminal
behavior within the wall of his own home. Moreover his family and friends are nearby, their
presence lending moral support. In his own office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the law.
Id. at 449-50. The Court also noted that the manuals instructed the police to "display an air of conlidence in the suspect's guilt ..... Id. (footnote omitted). The interrogator -must rely on an oppressive
atmosphere of dogged persistence ... leaving the subject no prospect of surcease ... with no respite
from the atmosphere of domination." Id. at 451. (footnote omitted). Cf. Wats v. Indiana, 338 U.S. at
54. "Under our system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out of
his own mouth. It must establish its case, not by interrogation of the accused even under judicial
safeguards, but by independently secured through skillful investigation." ld.
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However, by sanctioning deliberate police deception in Moran, the Supreme
53
Court contradicted this principle.
One commentator has suggested three principal reasons for the Moran majority's rationale: the police followed proper procedure in providing the warnings
and securing valid waivers; the state of mind of the police is irrelevant with respect to the validity of a waiver; and the Court was reluctant to upset the balance
between law enforcement and the rights of an accused 5 4
Quite simply, the Moran Court viewed the Miranda warnings not as a means
to proscribe police conduct in situations involving custodial interrogation, but instead as ends in themselves.5 5 Consequently, the state's "heavy burden" to
demonstrate a valid waiver is drastically diminished because the state need only
show that the police properly gave the prescribed warnings and that the accused
understood and waived his rights. However, the Miranda Court was concerned
with the coercive nature of custodial interrogations. Miranda held that mere
knowledge of one's rights was not enough for a valid waiver, but that an understanding of one's rights had a direct bearing on whether one validly waived those
56
rights.

Nonetheless, the majority's rejection of Burbine's Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim prompted Justice Stevens to suggest that this type of decision is
appropriate in an "inquisitorial society.",57 Furthermore, Justice Stevens asserted
that an assessment of police conduct is essential to keep faith with the fundamental spirit of Miranda.58 Indeed, one commentator suggested that the police con53 See, e.g., Althea Kuller, Moran v. Burbine: Supreme Court Tolerates Police Interference with
the Attorney-Client Relationship, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 251 (1986); Daniel J.Lynch, Moran v. Burbine:
ConstitutionalRights of CustodialSuspect, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 331 (1987); Laura Antonelli, Moran v.
Burbine: The Decline of Defense Counsel's 'Vital' Role In The CriminalJustice System, 36 CAmi. U. L.
REv. 253 (1986); Alexander H. Pitofsky, A Missed Opportunity To Curb Police Deception Of Criminal
Defense Attorneys, Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.Ct. 1135 (1986), 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 89 (Summer
1987); Harvard Law Review Association, Right To Counsel-Effective Waiver, 100 HARv. L.REv. 125
(1986); Daniel W. Sasaki, Guarding The Guardians: Police Trickery And Confessions, 40 STAN. L.
REv. 1593 (1988); Lorraine J. Adler, New York's Loyalty to the Spirit of Miranda: Simply the Best for
Twenty-Five Years, 47 VAND. L. REv. 889 (1994).

54 See Alexander H. Pitofsky, A Missed Opportunity To Curb Police Deception Of Criminal
Defense Attorneys, Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.Ct 1135 (1986) 25 Am.CriM. L REv. 89 (Summer 1987).
55 See Adler supra note 7, at 896.
56 Id. (suggesting that the MirandaCourt's greatest concern was the inherent coercive nature
of custodial interrogations and the privacy and secrecy in which they are conducted and such concern
is totally independent of a suspect's knowledge of his rights. This commentator also criticized the
Moran majority regarding the inconsistency in the court's rationale given that the Court recognized
that had Burbine known of his attorney's attempts he might not have confessed, This acknowledgment should have signaled to the Court that some element of coercion existed).
57 Moran, 475 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Moran decision properly
turns on an assessment of the role of an attorney and that "if a lawyer is seen as a nettlesome obstacle
to the pursuit of wrongdoers-as in an inquisitorial society-then the Court's decision today makes a
good deal of sense").
58 Id. at 452-56.
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duct in Moran was reminiscent of police practices against which the Miranda
Court sought to protect. 59 Justice Stevens noted that the fundamental basis for
due process "requires fairness, integrity, and honor in the operation of the criminal justice system.60 Because police misconduct interferes with the attorney-client relationship, it clearly violates the "due process requirement of fundamental
fairness."

61

The Moran Court refused to adopt per se rules prescribing police conduct in its
dealings with defense counsel because it would "muddy the clear waters of Miranda." 62 However, the Moran Court muddied the waters by adopting the
"shock the sensibilities" test without first establishing guidelines as to what would

constitute excessive conduct. 63 Moreover, adopting such a test demonstrates that
the Court recognized that there are instances where police conduct would be
egregious enough to violate due process. By deliberately lying to an officer of the
court, the police did not engage in "egregious" enough conduct to violate
Burbine's due process rights. One can only imagine the sort of police behavior
that would "shock the sensibilities" so as to violate one's constitutional rights. 4
Regardless, there can be no doubt that the Moran decision clearly sanctions de-

liberate police deception of an accused and his attorney, and thereby undermines
the basic principles of fairness and integrity of our criminal justice system.

59 Irene Merker Rosenberg, Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest ProposalForThe Abolition Of Olstodial Interrogation,68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 92-93 (1989) (noting that the Miranda Court cited the police
practices detailed in police manuals as justification for an absolute per se prophylactic rule). The
.principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being alone with
the person under interrogation." 384 U.S. at 449 (quoting F. Inbau and J. Reid, CriminalInterrogatiun
and Confessions 1 (1962). See also Moran, 475 U.S. at 443-50, (Stevens, J., dissenting.) (criticizing the
majority for making findings of fact regarding the voluntariness of Burbine's waiver that even the trial
judge refused to make, and noting that at one point Burbine was in an interrogation room with three
detectives from Providence and the two Cranston detectives. Subsequently, one of the Cranston
detectives spent "five to ten minutes" alone with Burbine. This detective testified that "Burbine
banged and kicked the door." Afterward, the detective announced that Burbine wanted to talk).
60 475 U.S. at 466-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Laura Antonelli, Moran v. Burbine: 77Te
Decline of Defense Counsel's 'ital' Role In The CriminalJustice System, 36 CAmu. U. L Rrv. 253,
284 (1986) (criticizing the Moran majority's standard that under "more egregious" circumstances.
than those in Moran, the accused individual's due process right to fundamental fairness would be
violated as ambiguous.).
61

475 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

62 Id at 425.
63 See Lynch supra note 9, at 352-53 (calling the 'shock the sensibilities' test established in
Moran a "nebulous standard" and criticizing the Court for failing to provide guidelines "which would
more clearly define conduct that shock societies sensibilities").
64 See Rosenberg supra note 59, at 96 (suggesting that the Moran decision can be interpreted by
the police that as long as they simply read a suspect his Miranda rights any police misconduct "short
of a rubber hose" would be tolerated).
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IH.

THE STATES' RESPONSE

[D]ecisions of the [Supreme] Court are not, and should not be, dispositive
of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state
law .... Yet the very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies
constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the breach .... With federal scrutiny diminished, state courts must respond by increasing their
65

own.

Nine years before Moran, Justice Brennan recognized that the Supreme Court
had begun to curtail individual rights.66 Justice Brennan encouraged state courts
to use their own state constitutions and laws to provide the necessary safeguards
for its citizens. 67 Subsequently, in Moran, Justice O'Connor followed Justice
Brennan's advice and noted that, "[n]othing we say today disables the States
from adopting different requirements for the conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law." 68 As a result, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Michigan, and Oregon have construed respective sections of their state constitutions, pertaining to the right against self incrimination, more broadly than the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. Kentucky relies on the state's rules of criminal procedures while Louisiana combines
both constitutional and statutory law in refusing to follow Moran. New Jersey's
rationale for opposing Moran is based on state common law. Finally, New York
adopted an absolute per se rule prior to Moran which has endured post Moran.
A.

State Constitutional Basis

Connecticut
In Connecticut, the police have a duty to act "reasonably, diligently, and
promptly to provide counsel with accurate information and to apprize the suspect
of efforts by counsel" to provide legal assistance. 69 Article 1, § 8 of the state
constitution and historical precedent forms the basis for the Connecticut
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Stoddard.70 Although Stoddard established
65 William J. Brennan Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REv.489, 502-03 (1977).
66 Id. at 495.
67 Id. at 503.
68 Moran, 475 U.S. at 428.
69 See State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 452 (Conn. 1988).
70 Id. CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 8. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be
heard by himself and by counsel... [n]o person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." See also Michael S. Siefert,
People v. Wright: Does Michigan Extend the Right Against Self Incrimination Beyond The Federal
GuaranteesOf Miranda?,1993 DET. C. L. Rev. 1727, 1752-53 (1993); Joseph R. Grodin, State Constltutionalism In Practice,30 VAL. U. L. REv. 601, 614 (1996).
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a prophylactic rule mandating that the police inform a suspect of an attorney's
attempts to contact the suspect, the court refused to establish a "blanket rule of
exclusion or admissibility" for the failure of the police to do so. 7 In fact, to
determine the validity of a waiver the court adopted a totality of the circumstances test, like Moran.7 2 The Court reasoned that the states' existing rules for
evaluating a valid waiver fully supports use of the totality of the circumstances
test.73 Therefore, the Connecticut Supreme Court refused to follow Moran by
mandating that the police inform an accused of an attorney's efforts to contact
him. Unfortunately, the court limited any beneficial effect of such a rule by not
requiring that police failure to follow the rule would result in automatic exclusion
of any evidence garnered as a result of such violation.
Delaware
In Delaware, a suspect cannot knowingly and intelligently waive his right to
counsel, guaranteed under Article I, § 7 of the state constitution where the state
prevents a suspect's attorney from rendering legal advice during custodial interrogation.74 The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that denying a suspect the assistance of counsel violated the state's due process provision in Bryan v. State.7 A suspect has an "unqualified opportunity to consult with counsel" before custodial interrogation begins provided that "[t]he lawyer has clearly made a reasonable, diligent, and timely attempt to render legal advice or otherwise provide
legal services on behalf of his client, the accused, and ... the lawyer has been
specifically retained or designated to represent the accused." 76 Moreover, satisfying the above two conditions establishes a "heavy presumption against
waiver.",77 Furthermore, the attorney need not be present at the precinct to
render assistance, and the court discerned no distinction between an attorney
who informs the police over the phone, "Don't interrogate my client," and one
who is present in the precinct and says, "I want to consult with my client." The
71 Stoddard, 537 A.2d at 456.
72

Id.

73 Id.
74 See Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170, 177 ( Del. 1990) (affirming Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 67486 (Del. 1983) which held that where the police intentionally or negligently fail to inform a suspect
that an attorney, specifically retained or properly designated, is at the police station and is prevented
from rendering legal advice or assistance to her client, then any statement or evidence obtained by the

police after thwarting the attorney's request is not admissible under any theory that the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel). Dr.. Co..sr. art. 1.
§ 7. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and his counsel...
he shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, unless by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." Id.
75 571 A.2d at 177.

76 Id. at 175.
77 Id.
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decision to waive one's rights is ultimately the accused's. 78 The court emphasized
that a waiver will never satisfy the totality of the circumstances test if the police
do not inform the accused that an attorney is attempting to provide legal services. 79 Consequently, any other decision would sanction "affirmative police interference in a communication between an attorney and a suspect."8 0
Illinois

Regardless of the United States Supreme Court's current views on waiver
of the right to counsel under the Federal Constitution, the law in Illinois
remains that when police, prior to or during custodial interrogation, refuse
an attorney appointed or retained to assist a suspect access to the suspect,
there can be no knowing waiver of the right to counsel if the suspect has not
been informed that the attorney was present and seeking to consult with
him.8 '

With this powerful statement, the Illinois Supreme Court not only refused to
follow Moran, but, more importantly, broke with the states' traditional lockstep
doctrine to follow United States Supreme Court precedent where state constitutional provisions are comparable to provisions in the United States
82
Constitution.
Police conduct that denied an attorney retained by defendant's family access
to the defendant during custodial interrogation and failed to tell a defendant that
the attorney was present and sought to consult with him, violated the defendant's
state constitutional rights thereby warranting suppressing defendant's statements
the court held in People v. McCauley.s 3 While the court acknowledged that Moran controlled the suppression of any statements based on the United States Constitution, it strongly asserted the state's authority to provide its citizens with "a
78 Id. at 176. See also Weber, 457 A.2d at 686.
79 See Bryan, 571 A.2d at 176.
80 Id. (citing Moran 475 U.S. at 456 n. 42) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
81 People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923, 930 (Ill. 1994); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("No person
shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself nor be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense.").
82 See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Incommunicado Interrogation Under The Federal And Illinois
Constitutions, 81 ILL- B. J. 74 (1993) (challenging the legitimacy of McCauley stating inter alia the
decision violated previous state Supreme Court decisions regarding the lockstep doctrine). See also
Thomas B. McAffee, The Illinois Bill Of Rights And Our Independent Legal Tradition: A Critique Of
The Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S. ILL. U. L. J. 1 (Fall 1987). Gaumer cites this article as an "excellent in-depth analysis of Illinois lockstep jurisprudence."
83 McCauley, 645 N.E.2d at 929. ILL. CoNsr. art. 1, § 2. "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law nor be denied equal protection of the laws." ILL.
CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("No person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself
nor be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.").
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greater degree of protection. " ' 4 The court directly contravened Moran by specifically stating that the Illinois Constitution prohibited police conduct that deceives
individuals in custody. 85 The court recognized that such deceptive police conduct
violated one of the basic principles against which Mirandasought
to protect-the
6
intrinsic coercive nature of incommunicado interrogationY
Michigan

In Michigan, Article 1, § 17 of the state constitution affords defendants greater
procedural protection than the federal constitution. 87 In direct contrast to Moran, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the police failure to inform the
defendant that an attorney had been retained on his behalf, and that the attorney
had attempted to contact him nullified the defendant's waiver of rights under the
state constitution in People v. Bender.88 Moreover, the Court in Bender extended
the prophylactic rule established in People v. Wright.8 9 In Wright, the Court held
that the police had a duty to inform a defendant of his attorney's in-person attempts to contact the defendant. 90 The court relied on the majority's suggestion
in Moran that states are free to adopt more protective standards under state law.
Consequently, the court extended the rights afforded a suspect under the Michigan Constitution before a 9suspect
can knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights
1
against self-incrimination.

84 645 N.E.d at 929.
85 Id.
86 Miranda,384 U.S. at 457. See also Escobedo v. Ilinois. 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964) [lit would
be highly incongruous if our system of justice permitted the district attorney, the lawyer representing
the State, to extract a confession from the accused while his own lawyer, seeking to speak with him.
was kept from him by the police." Id.
87 See People v. Bender, 551 N.W. 2d 71,80 (Mich. 1996); Mtic. CoNST. 1963, art. 1. § 17 (-No
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... The right to counsel
before and during interrogation is an ancillary right to the privilege against compelled selfincrimination.").
88 Bender, 551 N.W.2d at 82 (holding that "the police failed in their duty to inform [the defendants] that their attorney's attempted to contact them before they made their statements, information
crucial to their making a knowing and intelligent waiver").
89 490 NAV. 2d 351 (Mich. 1992).
90 Wright 490 N.W. 2d at 357.
91 Id. There is, however, some confusion as to what the Court in Bender based its decision on
given that it was a four to three decision with three justices signing the lead opinion and four justices
signing the concurring opinion. The lead opinion cited the Michigan Constitution as the basis for its
holding. The concurring opinion, however, stated that it was unnecessary to interpret the Michigan
Constitution. Instead, Chief Justice Brinkley wrote that it was more appropriate to look at law enforcement practices, as the Supreme Court did in Miranda, and to simply announce a prophylactic
rule. Regardless, unlike the majority's opinion in Moran, the Bender Court held that what transpires
outside the interrogation room and unbeknownst to the defendant does have a bearing on whether
one waives ones rights knowingly and voluntarily where the police refuse to inform a defendant of his
counsel's attempts to contact him. Inasmuch as the decision in Bender was a four to three decision
there is some controversy regarding the binding effect of the decision. Id. See James T. Carroll. Ill, A
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Oregon

Police violated Article 1, § 12 of the Oregon state constitution by not inform93
92
ing an accused of his attorney's attempts to contact him. In State v. Simonsen,
the Court overturned an individual's death sentence for aggravated murder holding that where unknown to the accused
an identified attorney is actually available and seeking an opportunity to
consult with [the accused], and the police do not inform [the accused] of
that fact, any statement or the fruits of any statement obtained after the
police themselves know of the attorney's efforts to reach the arrested person cannot be rendered admissible on the theory that the person knowingly
and intelligently waived counsel.9 4

The Simonsen court reaffirmed State v. Haynes,95 a pre-Moran decision. In
Haynes, the court held that a waiver of one's rights is not valid under Article 1,
§ 12 of the state constitution when the police failed to inform the defendant of a
retained attorney's telephone call to the police that he was on his way to the
station to consult with his client.96 The Haynes court established an often quoted
rationale for requiring law enforcement officials to advise a suspect that an attorney had been retained on her behalf:
To pass up an abstract offer to call some unknown lawyer is very different
'from refusing to talk with an identified attorney actually available to provide at least initial assistance and advice, whatever might be arranged in the
long run. A suspect indifferent to the first offer may well react differently to
the second. If the attorney appears
on request of one's family, that fact may
97
inspire additional confidence.
Although the Haynes court expressly rejected New York's absolute per se rule, it
did acknowledge that such a rule would preclude recurring problems of who and
when an attorney had been retained on behalf of a defendant. 98
Look At People v. Bender: What Happens When The Michigan Supreme Court Oversteps Its Power To
Achieve A Result-Oriented Decision, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 211 (Winter 1997) (contending that
since the lead opinion, which based its decision on the Michigan Constitution was signed by only three

justices it is not binding precedent. Moreover, since the concurring opinion based its decision on
federal law and the U.S. Constitution it was bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Moran.).

92 See State v. Simonsen, 878 P.2d 409, 410 (Or. 1994). OR. CONST. art. 1, § 12 ("No person
shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense, nor be compelled in any criminal prosecution to
testify against himself.")
93 Simonsen, 878 P.2d at 409-10.
94 Id. at 411-12. The incriminating statements made by the defendant, which the court held
must be suppressed, were used only as evidence in the penalty-phase proceeding. d. at 409-10.
95 602 P.2d 272 (Or. 1979).
96 Haynes, 602 P.2d at 279-80.
97 Id. at 278.
98 Id. at 278-79.
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B. State Law or Rule Basis
Kentucky
In Kentucky, the rules of Criminal Procedure provide that an individual in
custody, or someone acting on his behalf, could request an attorney and have the
attorney present with the individual in custody.99 In West v. Commonwealth of
Kentucky,10 0 a suspect had been picked up for questioning in a murder investigation.' 0 l Shortly thereafter a family member contacted the public defender's office to secure representation
for the suspect. 10 2 The police refused the public
03
West.'
to
defender access
The importance of this case is twofold. First, the court specifically held that
1 4
the language of its rules of criminal procedure are clear and unambiguous;
counsel shall be permitted to visit the suspect in custody regardless of whether
the attorney is private counsel or a public defender.'0 5 Moreover, the person
need only be subject to custodial interrogation and not formally charged.t" Secondly, the court expressly rejected that Moran controlled given that the United
States Supreme Court7 had declared that states were free to adopt their own rules
10
based on state law.
Louisiana
In a series of cases that predate Moran, the Louisiana courts have held that an
individual's right to counsel under the Louisiana Constitution extends beyond the
rights found in the United States Constitution.1es Moreover, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that under state constitutional and statutory law an individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation and that
99

Ky. R. CGUm. P. 2.14 provides:

1) A person in custody shall have the right to make communications as soon as
practicable for the purpose of securing the services of an attorney; and 2) Any attorney-at-law entitled to practice in the courts of this Commonwealth shall be permit-

ted, at the request of the person in custody or of someone acting on his behalf, to
visit the person in custody.
100 West v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 887 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1994).
101 Id. at 340.
102 Id.

103
104
105
106
107

Id
Id. at 342.
West, 887 S.W.2d at 342.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 342-43.

108 State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982) See also,Tamera A. Rudd, Louisiana'sRight
To CounselIn Light of Moran v. Burbine, 48 LA. L Rav. 201(1987) (analyzing pre-Moran state court
decisions based on both the state constitution and statutes which strongly suggests that in Louisiana
the Moran decision would have no effect).
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state authorities may not interfere with this right.' 0 9 Article 1, § 13 of the 1974
Louisiana Constitution provides that an individual subjected to custodial interrogation has the right to have one's retained or appointed counsel present during
0
questioning."1
Two state statutes pre-dating the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda acknowledged the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation and prescribed fundamental protections for an accused.'
An analysis of the enactment
of these statutes and the subsequent Miranda decision is an important indicator
to determine current state policy with respect to one's right and access to counsel."12 Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that Article 1, § 13 of the
state constitution as well as two provisions in the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure provide that the underlying state policy affords an attorney the opportunity to confer with a client so that the client may knowingly and intelligently
3
exercise his rights during custodial interrogation."1
New Jersey
In New Jersey the right against self-incrimination is not based on state constitutional law, rather the right "has been an integral thread in the fabric of New
Jersey common law.""' 4 Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
109 Matthews, 408 So. 2d at 1277-78.
110

LA. CONST. art. 1, § 13

When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention, his
right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel
and, if indigent, his right to court appointed counsel. In a criminal prosecution, an accused
shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. At each stage of the
proceedings, every person is entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice, or appointed by
the court if he is indigent and charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment. The
legislature shall provide for a uniform system for securing and compensating qualified counsel for the indigents.
See also Hargrave, Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REv 1, 40
(1974) (suggesting that the procedural safeguards announced in Miranda were incorporated in this
article in the 1974 revision of the state constitution).
111 Rudd, supra note 107 at 206; LA. REV.STAT. § 15:451. "Before what [purports sic] to be a
confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements,
or promises." LA. REv.STAT. § 15:452. "No person under arrest shall be subjected to any treatment
designed by effect on body or mind to compel a confession of a crime."
112 Rudd, supra note 107 at 206.
113 See Matthews, 408 So.2d at 1278. LA. CODE GRIM. PRO. Title V. Article 230 provides "The
person arrested has, from the moment of his arrest, a right to procure and confer with counsel and to
use a telephone or send a messenger for the purpose of communicating with his friends or with counsel." Title XIV. Article 511 provides "The accused in every instance has the right to defend himself
and to have the assistance of counsel. His counsel shall have free access to him, in private, at reasonable hours."
114 State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 630, 637 (N.J. 1993).

MAINTAINING AN ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE

police failure to inform a suspect that attorney was present and asking to speak
with defendant violated New Jersey's privilege against self-incrimination. The
rationale underlying the Reed decision was two-fold. First, the court acknowledged that in order to substantiate the reliability of confessions, the intrinsic coercive nature of custodial interrogations must be reduced. Second, to abate the
propensity of "unreasonable police conduct" in situations where the police know
that a suspect has a retained attorney, the police must not be allowed to desperately seek to obtain a confession before the suspect has a chance to talk with her
115
attorney.
New York
The absolute per se rule adopted in People v. Arthur'1 6 and its progeny states
that where a suspect is under custodial interrogation and an attorney has entered
the proceedings, there can be no waiver of one's Miranda rights outside of the
presence of the retained attorney. 1 7 This prophylactic rule has stood the test of
time. One commentator has suggested that it is the one rule which remains faithful to the spirit of Miranda and should be adopted by those states refusing to
follow Moran."8 However, this rule no longer upholds the true spirit of Miranda
for it does not protect an individual who may be represented on one charge but
not on the charge being investigated." 9
IV.
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Justice Stevens understood the uniqueness of the attorney-client relationship
and recognized that an attorney is not "some entirely distinct, completely severable entity and that deception of the attorney is irrelevant to the right of counsel in
115

Id at 642.

116 239 N.E. 2d 537 (N.Y. 1968).
117 Arthur, 239 N.E.2d at 539. See People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that
"any statements elicited by an agent of the State, however subtly, after a purported waiver' obtained

without the presence of counsel, are inadmissible"). d at 89. In fact this court stated further that the
Code of Professional Responsibility applied and that "any attempt to secure a waiver of the right to
counsel in a criminal proceeding in the absence of a lawyer, already retained or assigned" would
violate the code even in a criminal matter. Id. at 898; People v. Bartolomeo, 423 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y.
1981) (extending the Arthur per se rule by holding that "knowledge that an accused in custody is
represented by counsel on a separate and unrelated charge "precludes interrogation in the absence of
counsel and renders ineffective any purported waiver of the assistance of counsel when such waiver

occurs out of the presence of the attorney"). Id at 897.
118

See Adler, supra note 7, at 901-06 (analyzing state responses both pre and post Moran and

maintaining that the "rule of Arthur" is still the best safeguard against the coercive nature of custodial
interrogation).
119

People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1022-23 (N.Y. 1990) (overruling Barrolomneo holding that

although represented by counsel on unrelated charge, suspects can voluntarily waive their rights regarding current charges without the presence of counsel).
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custodial interrogation". 120 Given this uniqueness, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility prevents a lawyer from communicating with a represented
party.' 2 ' At the time of the Moran decision, case law suggested that the attorney-client relationship was identified as one entity for purposes relating to the
client's legal interest and that the disciplinary rules applied to both civil and criminal settings.' 22 The Minnesota Supreme Court illustrated this proposition in
1992 when it decided State v. Lefthand. 23 In Lefthand, the court reversed a defendant's murder conviction where the prosecutor assigned to the case, gave the
police permission to interrogate the defendant without prior notification to the
defendant's public defender.' 24 The court looked to the suspect's right to counsel
under both the federal and state constitution along with the state's rules of professional conduct'2 However, one commentator suggested that the Minnesota's
120 Moran, 475 U.S. at 464, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121

Id. at 464 n. 53 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) DR 7-

104(A)(1) ("during the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: communicate or
cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be
represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such
other party or is authorized by law to do so"). See also Althea Kuller, Moran v. Burbine: Supreme
Court Tolerates Police Interference with the Attorney-Client Relationship, 18 Loy. U. Ci. L.J. 251
(addressing the issue of ethical violations where a prosecutor interrogates a suspect without notifying
suspect's attorney).
122 Moran, 475 U.S. at 464 n. 53, (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. United States v. Foley, 735 F.2d
45, 48 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that prosecutorial practice of interviewing defendants in the absence of
counsel before arraignment "raises serious constitutional questions" and "contravene[s] the principles
of DR 7-104(A)(1)); State v. Yatman, 320 So.2d 401, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
Disciplinary Rule 7-104 (A)(1) of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies equally to
lawyers involved in the prosecution of criminal cases as in civil cases .... If any communication with a person represented by counsel on the subject under litigation is prohibited, then
taking the deposition of an individual charges with a criminal offense without notice to his
counsel regarding matters which are relevant to the criminal charges pending against said
represented individual is also clearly prohibited by the foregoing disciplinary rule.
United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1354-55 (CA 7 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing lhat
interview of defendant in absence of counsel would have violated DR 7-104 (A)(1) in civil context
and violated "procedural regularity" required by the Due Process Clause in criminal context).
123 488 N.W. 2d 799 (Minn. 1992).
124 Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 800.
125 Id. at 802. (footnote omitted)
We are also somewhat dismayed by state's counsel's belief that prosecutors are beyond the
reach of our professional conduct rules, specifically Rule 4.2, Minn. R. Pro. Conduct. We
note that the majority of jurisdictions presented with the issue have held that communicating
with defendants who are represented by counsel violates the applicable rules of professional
conduct.
See, e.g., United States v. Hammond, 858 F.2d 834, 839-840 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871
(1990); United States v. Foley, 735 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1161 (1985);
United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981); United
States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1223, 1224 n. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397,
399-400 (Utah Court. App. 1990); State v. Riley, 216 N.J.Super. 383, 523 A.2d 1089, 1092
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Rules of Professional
Conduct provided the underlying basis for the Lefthand
26
decision.'

Several years prior to Lefthand, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decided United States v. Hammond.127 In Hammond, the Court

held that the prosecutor violated the disciplinary rule prohibiting a lawyer from
communicating with a party she knew to be represented by counsel.'2 Moreover, the Court held that "this circuit conclusively established the applicability of
DR-7-104 (A)(1) to criminal prosecutions in United States v. Janil."'29 Although
the Court held that an exclusionary remedy may be appropriate as a result of
such an ethical violation, the Court ruled such a remedy inappropriate in the
present case. 1 30 Nonetheless, in response to Hammond, United States Attorney

General Richard Thornburgh issued a memorandum stating that government
lawyers "may properly gather evidence by communicating with any person who
has not been made the subject of formal federal criminal adversarial proceedings
...regardless of whether the person is known to be represented by counsel." 13 '
The Thornburgh memo outraged the ABA and criminal defense attorneys. 32 In
1994, United States Attorney General Janet Reno continued the federal government's war against the "no contact rule" by promulgating a regulation that federal prosecutors were exempt from the rule.' 3 3 Although states are free to adopt
(N.J.App.Div. 1987); People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 452-53 (Mich. 1979); People v. Hobson, 348
N.E.2d 894, 898-99 (N.Y. 1979).
126 See Edwin J. Butterfoss, Lisa J. Burkett, Extending The Guiding Lefthand Of Counsel: The
Minnesota Supreme Court Provides ProtectionAgainst Uncounseled Waivers Of The Right To Counsel
DuringInterrogations, 17 HA1mJnm L. Rnv. 307 (1997) (suggesting that since the Court in Lefthand
based it's decision on its "supervisory powers to insure the fair administration of justice" it is implied
that the decision is based on grounds other than constitutional or statutory). The Minnesota Rule of
Professional Conduct, 4.2 is similar to the former DR 7-104(A)(1).
127 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990) (holding that the prosecutor
violated the disciplinary rule prohibiting a lawyer from communicating with a party she knovs to be
represented by counsel).
128 Hammond, 858 F.2d at 839-40.
129 Id. at 838-39. 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that "DR-7-104 (A)(1) may be found to
apply in criminal cases... to government attorneys ... [and] to non-attorney government law enforcement officers when they act as the alter ego of government prosecutors").
130 Id. at 842.
131 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, A Bludgeon By Any Other Name: The Misuse Of -Ethical
Rules" Against Prosecutors To Control The Law Of The State, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL E'tcs 665, 739
(1996) (arguing that ethical rules are being used as an offensive weapon by the private criminal defense bar against government attorneys, to control or modify State law).
132 See Tom Watson, AG Decrees ProsecutorsMay Bypass Counsel, Legal Tmes, Sept. 25, 1"9,
at 1 (describing Attorney General Thornburgh's action as -a green light to ignore the Code of Professional Responsibility" by the president of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). It
must be noted that DR 7-104(A)(1) is similar to Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
133 See Todd S. Shulman, Wisdom Without Power: The Department of Justice's Attempt To Exempt FederalProsecutorsFrom State No Contact Rules, 71 N.Y.U. L REv. 1067 (1996) (analyzing the
"Reno rule" and examining the Department of Justice's authority in establishing said rule) (citing at
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procedural safeguards that go beyond those provided by the federal government,
prosecutors faced with the choice of charging an individual with a federal crime
as opposed to a state or local crime, have an added incentive to use federal law
given the Reno regulation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Twenty-four years ago Justice Goldberg set forth the challenge facing our society when he wrote that:
no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend
for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have
to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional
rights thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is
something very wrong with that system.
The Supreme Court accepted Justice Goldberg's challenge in deciding Miranda,
by recognizing the inherent nature of custodial interrogations and establishing a
prophylactic rule thereby diminishing the effect of such interrogations. Unfortunately, over the years there has been an erosion of these principles under the
Burger and Rehnquist Supreme Courts as evidenced in the Moran decision. The
Fourteenth Amendment's due process principle of fundamental fairness demands
that we as a society do not tip the scales of justice in favor of the argument for a
more effective law enforcement over the constitutionally protected rights of our
citizens, lest we choose to become an inquisitorial system of justice instead of
remaining an accusatorial one.

n.3, Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910, 39,912 (1994) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 77 (1975)) ("[Tlhe Department's rules are intended to fully preempt and supersede the application of state and local court rules relating to contacts by Department of Justice attorneys when
carrying out their federal law enforcement functions").

